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Abstract
Brock and Hommes (1997) introduce the concept of adaptive rational equilibrium
dynamics (ARED), where agents choose between a costly rational expectation
forecast and a cheap naive forecast, and the fractions using each of the two
strategies evolve over time and are endogenously coupled to the market
equilibrium price dynamics. In their setting agents are backward looking in the
sense that strategy selection is based on experience measured by relative past
realized pro¯ts. When the selection pressure to switch to the more pro¯table
strategy is high, instability and complicated chaotic price °uctuations arise.
In this paper we investigate the ARED with forward looking agents, whose
strategy selection is based upon expected pro¯ts. Our ¯ndings suggest that
forward looking behavior dampens the amplitude of price °uctuations, but local
instability of the steady state remains. The global dynamics depends upon how
sophisticated the forward looking behavior is. With perfectly forward looking
agents prices converge to a stable 2-cycle, while with forward looking agents
who are boundedly rational concerning their estimate of expected pro¯ts, small
amplitude chaotic price °uctuations may arise.
We also establish an equivalence relationship between a heterogeneous agent
model with switching of strategies and a representative agent framework, where
the representative agent optimally chooses between the bene¯ts of a high quality
forecasts and the associated information gathering costs. To an outside observer
it is impossible to distinguish between the two.
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11 Introduction
The work of Jean-Michel Grandmont (e.g. Grandmont (1982,1985,1998)) has played a
most stimulating role in the debate whether adaptive learning may or may not lead
to coordination and convergence to self-ful¯lling expectations in economic dynamic
systems. This debate is important, because instability of adaptive learning may explain
why ¯nancial markets exhibit excess volatility, i.e. are more volatile than justi¯ed by
underlying economic fundamentals.
Grandmont (1982) surveys the ¯eld of temporary general equilibrium theory. In this
theory, at each date t, agents form expectation functions for relevant quantities at date
t + 1, and given these expectations, agents optimize to produce demand functions at
date t. Markets then clear at date t to produce equilibrium prices and quantities at
date t. At date t + 1 the process is repeated for going into date t + 2. A sequence of
prices, quantities, and expectations, is produced. In principle, there could be feedback
from equilibrium prices and quantities into expectations functions but the expectations
need not be rational. Only the actions of the agents are coordinated by the price
system at each date t. Unlike rational expectations the plans for the future which
are made by the agents are not coordinated. As Grandmont (1982, p. 887) puts it,
\The aim of temporary equilibrium theory is to study the interaction through markets
of di®erent individuals in a given period, and to analyze the behavior over time of the
sequence of these equilibria.". Grandmont treats both spot markets and futures markets
in his review and focuses mostly on cases where agents plan one period ahead. Radner
(1982, p. 950) gives an early treatment of the rational expectations approach to general
equilibrium and links it to the temporary general equilibrium approach.
More recently, Grandmont (1998) focuses on dynamics rather than conditions for exis-
tence in a general temporary equilibrium setting. Grandmont (1998, p.743) identi¯es an
\uncertainty principle" under which learning generates instability: \learning generates
local instability of self-ful¯lling expectations whenever agents are on average uncertain
about the local dynamics of the system, and thus ready to extrapolate a wide range of
regularities (trends) out of past deviations from equilibrium, and when the in°uence of
expectations on the dynamics of the system is signi¯cant". Moreover, on local insta-
bility and global dynamics Grandmont (1998, p.743) notes: \I should emphasize that
the instability we are talking about is only local, and that plausible global nonlinearities,
originating from the agents' expectations scheme themselves, may keep the motion of the
system bounded. Thus even in the absence of shocks to the \fundamentals", or to expec-
tations, learning by itself might generate convergence to complex nonlinear (\chaotic")
attractors, hence self perpetuating endogenous °uctuations, along which forecasting er-
rors would never vanish." Finally, Grandmont (1998, p.744) puts discipline on such
complex \learning equilibria": \The ultimate test that this approach will have to pass,
however, is that such \learning equilibria" must, to be acceptable, exhibit a reasonable
degree of consistency with the agents' beliefs. In this respect, one might envision sit-
uations in which agents think that they are living in a world that is relatively simple,
although subject to random shocks, but in which deterministic \learning equilibria" are
complex (chaotic) enough to make the agents' forecasting mistakes still \self-ful¯lling"
in a well de¯ned sense".
2The purpose of our paper is to study a \toy model" of a compromise economy, along
the lines of Brock and Hommes (1997), where it is costly to possess fully structurally
rational expectations but less costly or free to possess \simpler" expectations. Our key
objective is to study the dynamics of such an economy in the simplest set of minimalist
models in which we can expose the ebb and °ow of forces to possess fully structural
rational expectations. Hence if it were very costly to purchase fully structurally ratio-
nal expectations our economy would act more like a Grandmont temporary general
equilibrium economy. Instead, if fully structural rational expectations were cheap our
economy would act more like a rational expectations economy. While it would be an
excellent research project to study such an economy with endogenous rational choice
of the \level of rationality" in a general equilibrium system at the level of generality of
Grandmont (1982) and Radner (1982), it turns out to be challenging enough to study
the impact of this extra level of dynamics of information choice in a simple cobweb
economy as we shall do here.
Brock and Hommes (1997), BH henceforth, introduce the concept of Adaptive Rational
Equilibrium Dynamics (ARED), which is an endogenous coupling between the selection
of expectations rules and market equilibrium dynamics. In the ARED, the consistency
requirement that has to be imposed upon learning rules, as emphasized by Grandmont,
is evolutionary selection of strategies, that is, agents switch to rules that have performed
well in the recent past1. Brock and Hommes (1998) apply this evolutionary switching
mechanism to an asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs; see Hommes (2006)
for an extensive survey of heterogeneous agent models in economics and ¯nance.
As a simple illustration of the ARED concept, BH 1997 consider a cobweb model
where agents can choose between two predictors: either a cheap naive predictor, where
the forecast for the price for tomorrow is the last observed price, or an expensive
rational expectation (perfect foresight) predictor. In order to choose between the two
predictors, agents compare their performance as measured by relative past realized
pro¯t. One of the main results in BH is that, when the selection pressure to switch
between a costly sophisticated rational and cheap simple naive strategy is high, the
price dynamics becomes locally unstable. As prices diverge, errors from the simple, naive
strategy increase and it becomes worthwhile to switch to the costly rational strategy,
pushing prices back close to the steady state. This interaction between a \close to the
steady state destabilizing force" and a \far from the steady state stabilizing force" leads
to complicated, chaotic price °uctuations. These complicated \learning equilibria" are
driven by past realized net pro¯ts of the expectation strategies. More precisely, in
the original BH (1997) model strategy selection is given by a discrete choice model
with a performance or ¯tness measure based upon past payo®s, i.e. realized pro¯ts,
from earlier choices of predictors. Strategy selection is thus based on \experience"
1Another type of complicated \learning equilibrium" in which forecasting mistakes are \self-
ful¯lling" in the spirit of Grandmont is the consistent expectations equilibrium (CEE), introduced
in Hommes and Sorger (1998). In a CEE, agents use a simple linear forecasting rule in an unknown
non-linear economy. A CEE arises when the sample average and sample autocorrelations of the non-
linear implied law of motion coincide with the corresponding linear belief. One possibility are chaotic
CEE with chaotic price °uctuations with sample average and sample autocorrelations exactly cor-
responding to a stochastic AR(1) process. See also Bullard (1994), SchÄ onhofer (1999) and Tuinstra
(2003) for similar complicated learning equilibria.
3or \regret", and agents tend to switch to strategies that have performed well in the
(recent) past. In the original BH (1997) model both the naive and the rational agents
are backward looking with respect to the choice of their prediction strategy but forward
looking in their production decision because they want to maximize expected pro¯ts.
In fact, these agents implicitly use past pro¯ts as a proxy for expected future pro¯ts.
One might argue that sophisticated agents should realize that other agents are making
their choices in this backward looking manner and will learn to use a more sophisticated
predictor selection strategy attempting to exploit the backward looking behavior. This
reasoning raises the obvious question: Will the BH (1997) instability results vanish
under a concept of sophisticated forward looking predictor strategy selection?
In this paper, we investigate ARED with agents who are forward looking concerning
their selection of strategies. For this purpose we reconsider the same cobweb model as
in BH (1997), in the case where agents evaluate the di®erent predictors based upon
their expected pro¯t instead of their realized pro¯ts. As one might expect by hind-
sight, forward looking behavior does dampen some of the instabilities uncovered by the
original BH (1997) work. The tendency to overshoot when \selection pressure" is high
is dampened. Indeed in one case the erratic dynamics is dampened down to a stable
2-cycle. In other cases however, small amplitude chaotic price °uctuations persist.
Our setup is also related to the concept of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) intro-
duced by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998). They also use a discrete choice model for
strategy selection in a game theoretic setting, with expected payo® as the performance
measure. See also Camerer et al. (2002), who study repeated games with various levels
of rationality. An important di®erence between these game theoretic settings and BH
(1997) is that in the latter case strategy selection is coupled to the dynamics of an
endogenous variable, say the market price, whose realization a®ects the performance
of all strategies.
A second contribution of this paper is to formulate a representative agent version of the
model, where the costs of information gathering of more sophisticated strategies are
endogenized. This approach is inspired by Simon (1955, 1957) and more recently by
Evans and Ramey (1992) and especially by Dudek (2004). We formulate hybrid models
based on Brock and Hommes (1997) and Dudek (2004), where a representative agent
chooses optimally among predictors of di®erent quality, where quality is purchased at
a cost which is increasing and convex in quality. We establish a close link between the
representative agent optimizing between the bene¯ts of sophisticated prediction rules
and information gathering costs and a heterogeneous agent framework with switching
of strategies. See Kirman (1992) for a critique upon the representative agent approach
in economics and Hommes (2006) and LeBaron (2006) for surveys of heterogeneous
agent modeling.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some facts from Brock and Hommes
(1997) to be used for comparison. Section 3 introduces forward looking behavior with
respect to strategy selection. Two di®erent cases will be discussed, one where agents
have perfect foresight on expected pro¯ts for strategy selection and one where agents
make a boundedly rational estimate of expected pro¯ts. Section 4 introduces a repre-
sentative agent who weighs expected pro¯ts versus information gathering costs. Section
5 concludes and all proofs are contained in an Appendix.
42 The original model
Following BH (1997), we recall some key features of the ARED in the simple economic
setting of the cobweb model with selection of forecasting rules based upon past realized
pro¯ts. The cobweb model describes price °uctuations in a competitive market for a
non-storable good which takes one period to be produced. We call pt+1 the price of the
good at time t + 1 and pe
t+1 the expectation at time t of the price at time t + 1. The
demand at time t + 1, D(pt+1), is a linear decreasing function:
D(pt+1) = A ¡ Bpt+1; A > 0;B > 0: (1)
The supply at time t + 1, S, is an increasing function of the producers' forecasts at
time t of the price at time t + 1. More speci¯cally, the supply curve S is derived from
expected pro¯t maximization:
S(p
e
t+1) = Argmaxx(xp
e
t+1 ¡ c(x)); (2)
where x is the amount of goods he decides to produce at time t and c(x) is the produc-
tion cost function. Since the decision is taken at time t, but the price is realized only
at time t + 1, producers have to condition their decision on their expected price pe
t+1.
Taking a quadratic cost function
c(x) =
x2
2b
; b > 0 (3)
gives the linear supply curve:2
S(p
e
t+1) = bp
e
t+1: (4)
We assume that agents (producers) can choose between two types of predictors, p
e;1
t+1
and p
e;2
t+1. Let n1
t and n2
t be the fractions of agents choosing at the end of time t (or
at the beginning of time t + 1) respectively predictor 1 and predictor 2. The market
clearing equation at time t + 1 is given by:
D(pt+1) = n
1
tS(p
e;1
t+1) + n
2
tS(p
e;2
t+1): (5)
We now have to specify how agents choose between the two prediction rules. BH (1997)
assume that agents are \comparing" past realized pro¯ts. At time t, the realized pro¯t
of strategy i is a function of both the realized price at time t, pt, and the predictor p
e;i
t ,
i = 1;2, used at time t ¡ 1. The price pt determines the price at which the goods are
sold, while the predictor p
e;i
t determines the amount of good produced by agent i. As
a result, the realized pro¯t at time t under expectations scheme i is given by
¼
i
t = ¼(pt;p
e;i
t ) = ptS(p
e;i
t ) ¡ c(S(p
e;i
t )) = ptbp
e;i
t ¡
(bp
e;i
t )2
2b
=
b
2
p
e;i
t (2pt ¡ p
e;i
t ): (6)
We consider the realistic case where one predictor, say pe;1, is more sophisticated or
of higher \quality" than the other predictor pe;2, which is just an easy to use rule
2The general case with non-linear demand and non-linear supply is investigated in Goeree and
Hommes (2000). Since it leads to similar results we restrict our analysis to the linear case.
5of thumb. The sophisticated predictor however is more \expensive" than the simple
predictor because it is more di±cult to compute or requires more information gathering.
In general we call C ¸ 0 the net costs for obtaining the sophisticated predictor.
As mentioned before, the choice of the predictor rule is based on the ¯tness or perfor-
mance measure for the two strategies. BH (1997) take last period's net realized pro¯ts
as the ¯tness measure, i.e.3
U
1
t = ¼
1
t ¡ C;
U
2
t = ¼
2
t;
¢Ut = ¢¼t ¡ C = ¼
1
t ¡ ¼
2
t ¡ C;
where ¢Ut is the di®erence in ¯tness and ¢¼t is the di®erence in realized pro¯ts (ex-
cost for the sophisticated rule). The fraction of the agents choosing predictor i at time
t is given by a discrete choice (logit) model:
n
i
t =
e¯Ui
t
Zt
; i = 1;2; (7)
where ¯ is the intensity of choice parameter and Zt =
P
e¯Uh
t is a normalization factor
such that n1
t + n2
t = 1. This model (7) is derived from a random utility framework;
see Brock and Hommes (1997) for more details and Anderson et al. (1993) for many
economic applications. The intensity of choice parameter ¯ determines how quickly
agents switch to di®erent strategies and it is inversely related to the noise level in
the random utility model. In the extreme case ¯ = 0 there is no switching at all and
both fractions are 0:5, whereas in the other extreme case ¯ = 1 all agents switch
immediately to the best predictor. In an evolutionary framework one can refer to ¯ as
the selection pressure. As ¯ increases the selection pressure increases, that is more and
more agents use the strategy with the higher ¯tness.
If we introduce mt = n1
t ¡ n2
t we can rewrite the market equilibrium equation as:
A ¡ Bpt+1 =
b
2
¡
p
e;1
t+1(1 + mt) + p
e;2
t+1(1 ¡ mt)
¢
where
mt+1 = tanh
µ
¯
2
(¢¼t+1 ¡ C)
¶
:
The framework introduced so far is still general in terms of the actual predictors used.
Following BH (1997) we consider the choice between costly rational expectations and
freely available naive expectations:
p
e;1
t+1 = pt+1;
p
e;2
t+1 = pt:
3More generally, BH 1997 introduce memory in the ¯tness measure which is a weighted average
of past realized pro¯ts. In this paper, we focus on the simplest case with ¯tness determined by last
period realized pro¯t.
6The ARED in the case of a rational expectation predictor \versus" a naive predictor
is then given by:
A ¡ Bpt+1 = b
2 (pt+1(1 + mt) + pt(1 ¡ mt)); (8)
mt+1 = tanh
¡¯
2
£
b
2(pt+1 ¡ pt)2 ¡ C
¤¢
: (9)
The timing in the ARED is important. First, the new market clearing price pt+1 is
determined using the old fractions n1
t and n2
t (or di®erence in fractions mt). Second,
the new realized market price pt+1 is used to update and determine the new fractions
n1
t+1 and n2
t+1 (or di®erence in fractions mt+1). Notice that in the market clearing
equation (8) pt+1 is only implicitly de¯ned, but it can be solved explicitly easily by some
map pt+1 = F¯;1(pt;mt). The ARED of the cobweb model with rational versus naive
expectations and strategy selection based upon realized pro¯ts is thus described by a
two-dimensional system of nonlinear di®erence equations (pt+1;mt+1) = F¯(pt;mt) =
(F¯;1(pt;mt);F¯;2(pt;mt)). We discuss the dynamics of F¯ as the intensity of choice, or
selection pressure, ¯, increases.
A straightforward computation shows that the unique steady state of the system is:
E = (p
¤;m
¤) =
µ
A
b + B
;tanh
µ
¡
¯C
2
¶¶
:
Notice that the steady state value of the di®erence in fractions, m¤ = m¤(¯), depends
upon ¯. In particular when costs for rational expectations C > 0, as the intensity
of choice ¯ increases, the steady state fraction of rational agents, n1¤ = (1 + m¤)=2,
decreases and n1¤ ! 0 as ¯ ! 1. The economic intuition is that at the steady state
p¤ there is no ¯tness advantage in buying a rational predictor, since both predictors
predict the same, correct, value. As the intensity of choice increases more and more
agents choose the naive predictor. The following Theorem (Theorem 3:1 in BH (1997))
summarizes the stability of the steady state.
Theorem 1 Assume that the slopes of supply and demand satisfy b=B > 1:
(i) When the information costs C = 0, the steady state E = (p¤;0) is always globally
stable;
(ii) When the information costs C > 0, then there exists a critical value ¯1 such that
for 0 · ¯ < ¯1 the steady state is globally stable, while for ¯ > ¯1 the steady state
is an unstable saddle point with eigenvalues 0 and
¸(¯) = ¡
b(1 ¡ m¤(¯))
2B + b(1 + m¤(¯))
At the critical value ¯1 the steady state value m¤(¯1) = ¡B=b.
(iii) When the steady state is unstable, there exists a locally unique period 2 orbit
f(~ p; ~ m);(¡~ p; ~ m)g with ~ m = ¡B=b. There exists a ¯2 > ¯1 such that the period 2
cycle is stable for ¯1 < ¯ < ¯2.
7The assumption b=B > 1 means that if all agents employ naive expectations, the market
will be unstable. The case with b=B < 1 is straightforward since it leads to convergence
to the steady state for all values in the parameter space. In the ARED with b=B > 1, as
soon as information costs are positive an increase in the intensity of choice destabilizes
the system, and yields an unstable saddle point steady state and the creation of a
(stable) two-cycle through a period doubling bifurcation. BH (1997) show that, as the
intensity of choice further increases, the two-cycle also becomes unstable and a rational
route to randomness, i.e. a bifurcation route to complicated chaotic price °uctuations
occurs. The mechanism responsible for generating complicated price dynamics is the
interplay between a local, close to the steady state, destabilizing force and a global, far
from the steady state, stabilizing force. The interplay is fostered by the evolutionary
switching mechanism. Technically, it is responsible for homoclinic bifurcations and the
presence of strange attractors in the dynamics of prices and fractions as discussed in
detail in BH (1997). Recently, the same mechanism and type of bifurcations have been
shown to generate complicated price °uctuations in other frameworks, for example a
Cournot duopoly model in Droste et al. (2002) or a ¯nancial market where informed
and uniformed agents coexist as in de Fontnouvelle (2000) and Diks and Dindo (2006).
The economic intuition of this phenomenon can be explained in the limiting case ¯ =
+1. For ¯ = 1 in each period, all agents choose the predictor with the highest ¯tness
measure, no matter how small or big this di®erence is. From (9), for ¯ = 1, the
di®erence in fractions mt is determined by:
mt =
8
<
:
+1; if b
2(pt ¡ pt¡1)2 > C
¡1; if b
2(pt ¡ pt¡1)2 · C
so that pt+1 is given by:
pt+1 = f1(pt;pt¡1) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
p
¤; if
b
2
(pt ¡ pt¡1)
2 > C
A
B
¡
b
B
pt; if
b
2
(pt ¡ pt¡1)
2 · C
(10)
The following Theorem (Theorem 3:2 in BH (1997)) characterizes the price dynamics
in this case.
Theorem 2 For ¯ = +1, even when the market is locally unstable (i.e. b=B > 1)
and when information costs C > 0, the system always converges to the saddle point
equilibrium steady state E = (p¤;¡1).
The reasoning behind the proof is quite instructive and provides a simple economic
intuition. For ¯ = 1 in each period either all agents are rational (m = +1) or all
agents are naive (m = ¡1). Assume e.g. that all agents are naive and let the price be
close to the steady state. For m = ¡1 the price will diverge from p¤ due to the local
instability. As long as m = ¡1, price °uctuations become bigger (in absolute value)
and errors made by the naive forecast will rapidly increase, until the point where
8the di®erence between realized pro¯ts of rational and naive expectations exceeds the
costs for rational expectations. At that point, for ¯ = 1, all agents buy the rational
predictor, so that m becomes +1, and in the next period the price jumps immediately
onto the steady state price p¤, and remains there forever.
For future comparison with the model of Section 3, it is instructive to compute the
di®erence between the maximum and the minimum observable price when ¯ = 1. We
de¯ne this maximum di®erence ¢f
1, where the superscript fand the subscript 1 refer
to the map f1 de¯ned in (10).
Lemma 1 When ¯ = 1, the di®erence between the maximum and the minimum ob-
servable price is ¢f
1 = 2
b2
B(B + b)
p
2C=b.
3 Strategy switching with forward looking agents
In the original BH-model agents are backward looking in their selection of prediction
strategies since their choice is based upon past realized pro¯ts, but they are forward
looking in their production decision because, given their price forecast, they maximize
expected pro¯ts. In this section we discuss the model with forward looking agents,
with both strategy selection and production decisions based upon expected pro¯t. In
the forward looking case, at time t the ¯tness measure di®erence used for strategy
selection between the rational and naive predictors becomes:
¢U
e
t+1 = ¢¼
e
t+1 ¡ C = ¼
e;1
t+1 ¡ ¼
e;2
t+1 ¡ C; (11)
where, as before, C represents the costs for the rational expectations predictor.
We will discuss two di®erent versions of the model with forward looking agents, de-
pending on the way agents compute their expected pro¯t. In subsection 3.1 all agents,
i.e. both agents using the rational and the naive forecast, have perfect foresight on
expected pro¯ts conditional on their production decision. We will refer to this case as
perfectly forward looking agents in strategy selection. In subsection 3.2 we discuss a
di®erent version of the model where agents using the rational price forecast still have
perfect foresight on expected pro¯ts, whereas the agents using the naive price forecast
employ their most recent observations to make a simple estimate of their expected
pro¯t. We will refer to this case as boundedly rational forward looking agents.
3.1 Perfectly forward looking agents
Consider forward looking agents and a discrete choice random utility model, with ex-
pected pro¯t as the ¯tness measure in the following way. As before, given the expected
price pe
t+1, the optimal supply S(pe
t+1) = bpe
t+1 is derived from expected pro¯t maximiza-
tion with quadratic production cost function. There are two price forecast strategies
available, the rational forecast at cost C and the free naive forecast. As before, market
equilibrium at time t + 1 is given by:
A ¡ Bpt+1 = n
1
tbpt+1 + n
2
tbpt: (12)
9The fraction of agents who adopt strategy i, ni
t, is determined via a discrete choice
model as in (7), but this time the ¯tness of each predictor is measured in terms of the
expectations at time t about pro¯ts at time t + 1:
n
i
t =
e¯U
e;i
t+1
Zt
; (13)
where Zt =
P
e¯U
e;h
t+1 is the usual normalization factor. The rational predictor is eval-
uated according to:
U
e;1
t+1 = ¼
e;1
t+1 ¡ C; (14)
whereas the naive predictor is evaluated according to:
U
e;2
t+1 = ¼
e;2
t+1: (15)
In both cases:
¼
e;i
t+1 = ¼(pt+1;p
e;i
t+1) = pt+1S(p
e;i
t+1) ¡ c(S(p
e;i
t+1)): (16)
Notice that the expected pro¯t, ¼
e;i
t+1 i = 1;2, depends both on the expected price
p
e;i
t+1, which determines the production decision at time t, and on the price that clears
the market at time t + 1, pt+1. We assume that the economy works \as if" agents
have perfect foresight on this second price. This implies that whatever their production
decision is, agents have perfect foresight on expected pro¯ts. Stated di®erently, given the
production decisions, fractions of the strategies are determined \as if" agents compute
expected pro¯ts without errors.
At this point it is useful to discuss a potential inconsistency problem in the model. If
agents have perfect foresight on the expected pro¯t, then, at time t, wouldn't they also
\know" the price forecast pt+1? If they could extract the perfect foresight price forecast
from perfect foresight on expected pro¯ts, there would be no incentive left to pay the
information cost C for the perfect price forecast. I.e., why buy the cow when you can
get the milk for nothing?
In order to avoid this behavioral inconsistency, we assume that there is an expert
manager who has \structural knowledge" about the economy enabling him to have
structural rational expectations. Each agent can choose either to run the business
by himself or hire an expert manager with \structural knowledge" of the economy
and rational expectations. The manager promises the agent a sure net pro¯t, after
subtracting an (unknown) cost C for his service. Agents take the decision to hire or
not to hire the rational expert manager by evaluating the ¯tness measure di®erence
(11) which is computed and announced by the expert manager and available as public
information. The fraction of agents that chooses to hire the rational expert manager
is determined by the di®erence in ¯tness announced by the manager, according to the
random utility framework. It is important that agents do not know the division between
pro¯ts and costs C in the net revenue they receive from their manager, because if they
did they could derive the perfect foresight forecast from public information. Notice also
that the manager is \credible" in the sense that, given the production decision of the
agents, the manager delivers the net pro¯ts that he announces.
We are aware of the limitations of these assumptions and we do not claim this to be
a realistic description of market behavior. Rather we view this model as an interesting
10theoretical benchmark with strategy switching determined by rational forward looking
behavior on expected pro¯ts. In this theoretical benchmark, forward looking strategy
switching is not a®ected by any mistakes of the agents in evaluating their expected
pro¯ts. In subsection 3:2 we will consider the probably more realistic case where some
forward looking agents make mistakes in evaluating their expected payo®.
Under the assumption of perfect foresight on expected pro¯ts for both types, the ex-
pected pro¯ts for rational respectively naive agents are given by
¼
e;1
t+1 = ¼(pt+1;p
e;1
t+1) = pt+1S(pt+1) ¡ c(S(pt+1)) =
b
2
p
2
t+1; (17)
¼
e;2
t+1 = ¼(pt+1;p
e;2
t+1) = pt+1S(pt) ¡ c(S(pt)) =
b
2
pt(2pt+1 ¡ pt); (18)
where p
e;1
t+1 = pt+1 and p
e;2
t+1 = pt. Notice that the ¯tness di®erence becomes:
¢U
e
t+1 =
b
2
(pt+1 ¡ pt)
2 ¡ C: (19)
The fractions of the two types are determined via a discrete choice model as before,
with ¯tness measure di®erence (19). Working again with the di®erence in fractions
mt = n1t ¡ n2t, the system is given by:
A ¡ Bpt+1 =
b
2
(pt+1(1 + mt) + pt(1 ¡ mt)); (20)
mt = tanh
µ
¯
2
·
b
2
(pt+1 ¡ pt)
2 ¡ C
¸¶
: (21)
We de¯ne a Managerial Perfect Foresight Equilibrium to be a time path of prices pt,
produced quantities xt;i, i = 1;2, fractions of agents choosing strategy i, ni
t, i = 1;2,
and point expectation of pro¯ts, ¼
e;i
t+1, i = 1;2, that, at each date t satis¯es equations
(12-18) with supply equals demand and ful¯lled point expectations. Co-evolution of
prices and (di®erence in) fractions is described by (20-21). We use the extra adjective,
Managerial, because our concept of perfect foresight equilibrium requires both agents
having perfect foresight (i.e. ful¯lled point expectations) on the amount of net revenue
(which is the net pro¯t received by the agent after deducting the manager's operating
cost, C), as well as the manager generating pro¯ts consistent with perfect foresight on
the date t + 1 price pt+1.
It is useful to compare the model with perfectly forward looking agents (20-21) to
the original model with backward looking agents (8-9). In the forward looking case
the di®erence in fractions mt is simply a one period ahead version of the backward
looking case. In fact, in the forward looking case the di®erence in fractions of the two
strategies, mt, depends upon pt and pt+1, implying that the market clearing equation
(20) is only implicitly de¯ned. The following result states that (20-21) translates into
a well de¯ned, explicit one-dimensional map pt+1 = g¯(pt) (see Figure 1).
Theorem 3 Given a linear demand and a linear supply curve, for any value of the
information cost C ¸ 0, the intensity of choice ¯ ¸ 0 and the initial price pt, (20-21)
11determines a well de¯ned map pt+1 = g¯(pt). That is, there exists a unique non-negative
price pt+1 such that, at time t + 1, either the market is in equilibrium or the excess
supply is positive at pt+1 = 0. Furthermore the map g¯ is continuous.
A straightforward calculation shows that, as before, p¤ = A=(b + B) is always the
unique ¯xed point of the map g1. The corresponding fraction di®erence m is again
given by m¤(¯) = tanh(¡¯C=2). The following theorem characterizes the dynamics:
Theorem 4 Assume that the slopes of supply and demand satisfy b=B > 1.
(i) When the information costs C = 0, the steady state E = p¤ is always globally
stable.
(ii) When the information costs C > 0, then there exists a critical value ¯1 such that
for 0 · ¯ < ¯1 the equilibrium is globally stable, while for ¯ > ¯1 the equilibrium
is unstable with eigenvalue,
¸(¯) = ¡
b(1 ¡ m¤(¯))
2B + b(1 + m¤(¯))
At the critical value ¯1 the steady state value m¤(¯1) = ¡B=b.
(iii) When the steady state is unstable, there exists a unique period 2 orbit fp1;p2g.
The period 2 orbit is globally stable for any value of ¯ > ¯1.
Compare the local stability of the system with forward looking agents as speci¯ed
in Theorem 4 with the local stability of the system with backward looking agents as
speci¯ed in Theorem 1. Points (i) and (ii) of both Theorems imply that for small
values of the switching parameter ¯ the systems behave similarly. When the switching
parameter is smaller than the primary bifurcation value ¯1 the steady state is stable,
while for ¯ > ¯1 a (stable) period 2-cycle is created. Notice that the primary bifurcation
value ¯1 is the same for both systems. For larger values of ¯, according to (iii), the
backward looking and forward looking cases are di®erent. In the backward looking
case the 2-cycle is stable only when ¯1 < ¯ < ¯2, whereas in the perfectly forward
looking case the 2-cycle is stable for all values of the switching parameter ¯ > ¯1. The
rational route to randomness (i.e. the bifurcation route to chaos) has disappeared due
to the perfectly forward looking strategy switching behavior of the agents. Technically,
no homoclinic bifurcation is observed and the interplay between local instability and
global stability is di®erent.
The reason that complicated dynamics does not arise is that perfectly forward looking
agents do not make mistakes in the estimation of their expected pro¯ts. In contrast,
backward looking agents use past realized pro¯ts to evaluate which predictor to use,
and therefore may make big mistakes. In particular, these mistakes may lead to big
losses for the agents who choose a naive predictor, especially when ¯ is high. In fact in
the backward looking case, when the cheap naive predictor has performed well in the
last period it attracts many agents. This triggers local instability with prices deviating
12more and more from the steady state and bigger and bigger errors in pro¯t estimation.
When these mistakes become su±ciently large and ¯ is high, many agents switch back
to the rational predictor, thus pushing prices back very close to the steady state. But
close to the steady state the cheap naive predictor works ¯ne and is less costly than the
rational predictor, so that the story repeats. When agents are perfectly forward looking
concerning expected pro¯ts, big mistakes by the naive predictor are anticipated by the
forward looking behavior, and therefore prices will not deviate from their steady state
very far nor will they be pushed back to the steady state very close.
An analysis of the case of an in¯nite switching parameter enables us to make this point
precise. Remember that in the case of backward looking agents for ¯ = 1 the price
always converges to the (locally unstable) steady state value, as stated in Theorem 2.
As we shall prove in the next theorem in the case of forward looking agents, in the
limit case ¯ = 1 prices always converge to a period 2 orbit. For ¯ = 1 the map g¯
de¯ned by (20-21) becomes (see Figure 2):
pt+1 = g1(pt) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
p
¤; pt 2 [0;p
¤ ¡ ~ p] [ [p
¤ + ~ p;1)
pt +
p
2C=b pt 2 (p
¤ ¡ ~ p;p
¤ ¡ ±~ p)
A
B
¡
b
B
pt; pt 2 [p
¤ ¡ ±~ p;p
¤ + ±~ p]
pt ¡
p
2C=b pt 2 (p
¤ + ±~ p;p
¤ + ~ p)
(22)
where ~ p =
p
2C=b and ± = B=(B + b) < 1.
Theorem 5 For ¯ = +1, when the market is locally unstable (i.e. b=B > 1) and
when information costs C > 0 the system always converges to a period 2 orbit. A
continuum of period 2 orbits exists. Furthermore the di®erence between the maximum
and the minimum observable price is:
¢
g
1 = 2
b
B + b
p
2C=b:
that is ¢
g
1 =
³B
b
´
¢
f
1 < ¢
f
1.
The last part of Theorem 5 points to another di®erence with the original model con-
cerning the size of °uctuations. Figure 2 illustrates this di®erence between the models
with backward looking and forward looking strategy selection. The backward look-
ing map f1 has a higher maximum and a lower minimum, that is ¢g
1 < ¢f
1. The
comparison of the two maps clari¯es that the globally stabilizing forces are di®erent.
In the backward looking case agents make larger errors and it takes one extra time
period before agents are ready to switch to the costly rational strategy. Moreover, if
the errors have grown too large, all agents share the same experience and all switch
to the costly rational strategy at the same time. In the forward looking case, agents
anticipate large mistakes and start switching to the rational strategy already before
13the errors grow too large. Moreover, forward looking behavior prevents all agents to
switch at the same point in time, but instead ensures a smooth and gradual switching
to the costly rational strategy, leading to smooth dynamics and an interval of 2-cycles
at some not too far away distance from the steady state with rational and naive agents
co-existing (see the parts of the graph of g1 parallel to the diagonal). In this model,
forward looking behavior based on expected pro¯ts instead of realized pro¯ts leads to
smoother transitions and dampened °uctuations in the short run but also prevents the
system to return (close) to the steady state price in the long run.
The presence of a regular 2-cycle for a large interval of values of the switching para-
meter ¯ (e.g. Figure 3) raises the question whether boundedly rational agents are able
to detect the regular structure from time series observations and exploit it? Stated
di®erently, is the 2-cycle equilibrium \evolutionary stable", that is, will the cycle per-
sist when other boundedly rational agents \invade" the system? We will not address
this problem in detail here, but investigate the question by some simple simulations,
illustrated in Figure 4. The answer depends on whether or not additional boundedly
rational forecasting rules have costs associated to them, e.g. higher costs when the
rule uses more memory. In what follows all agents, including those using the new price
forecasting rules, have perfect foresight on expected pro¯ts as before. First consider
the case where rational expectations at cost C versus free naive expectations leads to
a stable 2-cycle. Suppose a new forecasting rule pe
t+1 = pt¡1 (call it a period-2 rule), at
costs C0, 0 < C0 < C, enters the system. Along the 2-cycle this period-2 rule has in fact
perfect foresight, and since it is cheaper than the rational perfect foresight rule, many
agents will start using the period-2 rule. Figure 4 shows that the system with rational
versus period-2 versus naive locks into another stable 2-cycle, with smaller amplitude
because of the lower costs for the period-2 rule. The costly rational expectations rule is
(almost) driven out of the market and replaced by the cheaper (but still costly) period-
2 rule, but the long run equilibrium outcome remains a stable 2-cycle (with smaller
amplitude).
Next consider the case where costly rational versus free naive expectations leads to a
stable 2-cycle, and a new period-2 rule at zero costs invades the system. Figure 4 shows
that the system with costly rational versus free naive versus free period-2 converges to
a stable 3-cycle of smaller amplitude. The intuition is that along the original 2-cycle,
agents switch to the period-2 rule because its forecast is the same as the rational rule
but at no costs. As a consequence, the amplitude of price °uctuations decreases, which
leads to smaller forecasting errors of the naive rule and thus an increase of the fraction
of agents using the naive rule. With the naive and the period-2 rule both having positive
fractions the system locks into a stable small amplitude 3-cycle. We can continue the
story and introduce an additional type using a period-3 rule (i.e. pe
t+1 = pt¡2) entering
the market. This system with 4 di®erent rules locks into a stable 4-cycle with even
smaller amplitude as shown in Figure 4. Similarly, adding a new ¯fth type, a period-4
rule, the system locks into a stable 5-cycle with very small amplitude. Finally, adding
a period-5 rule, the system stabilizes and locks into the stable steady state price. The
intuition is that with more and more period-k forecasting rules at no costs, many rules
gain positive weight and the system behaves as if agents use (a weighed average) of
past prices as their forecast, thus stabilizing price °uctuations.
14The key point of this simulation exercise is that when new boundedly rational fore-
casting rules \invade" the system and more memory comes at higher costs, the stable
2-cycle persists but has smaller amplitude. In contrast, when there are no costs associ-
ated to boundedly rational rules with more memory, price °uctuations stabilize. This
situation is similar to the simulation experiments of the El-Farol bar problem in Arthur
(1994), where \cycles are quickly arbitraged away" by cycle-detector predictors. An-
other example, where autocorrelation structure is arbitraged away by simple rules, is
presented in Dindo and Tuinstra (2006). They argue that this may be a characteristic
feature of systems with negative feedback from expectation to realization, as in the
cobweb model.
3.2 Boundedly rational forward looking agents
In the previous subsection all agents were perfectly forward looking concerning expected
pro¯ts. In this subsection we back o® from perfect rationality and assume that in
order to choose their strategy some agents only make a boundedly rational estimate
of expected pro¯ts. As in the previous subsection, we assume that each agent is faced
with the choice of either hiring an expert manager to run the business or to run the
business himself. In the ¯rst case, the story unfolds as in the previous subsection: by
hiring an expert manager, the owner is promised at time t to receive at time t + 1 a
sure pro¯t U
e;1
t+1 as computed in (14) and (17). The manager promising this last payo®
uses rational expectation and keeps an (unknown) amount C of the pro¯t of the ¯rm
for himself. As a result U
e;1
t+1 = ¼
e;1
t+1 ¡ C. Since the agent (the owner of the ¯rm) does
not know C, he is not able to extract the rational expectation price forecast at the time
he compares the two expected net pro¯ts. The computation of the ¯tness in the second
case, when the owner decides to run the business by himself, is done in a di®erent way
than in the previous subsection. Equation (15) still holds but, in this case, we assume
that the naive agent makes an estimate of the expected pro¯t. We refer to this case
as boundedly rational forward looking agents. We focus here on a simple case where
the naive agents use their naive forecast both in the production decision and in the
forecast of the expected pro¯t. Instead of (18) he uses:
¼
e;2
t+1 = ¼(p
e;2
t+1;p
e;2
t+1) = ¼(pt;pt) =
b
2
(pt)
2: (23)
In Subsection 3.1 agents switch between prediction strategies only because one of the
two is granted a higher pro¯t by the manager. In the present case, agents are switching
between the two predictors not only because naive agents make price forecasting errors,
but also because they make a wrong estimate of the expected payo® they will get by us-
ing the naive predictor. As we shall see this additional error complicates the qualitative
dynamics, but does not change the amplitude of the price °uctuation signi¯cantly.
Summing up, at time t, the expected ¯tness di®erence of the two predictors is:
¢U
e
t+1 =
b
2
(p
2
t+1 ¡ p
2
t) ¡ C: (24)
The fraction of agents using the predictor i = 1;2 at time t is as in (13). Using
15mt = n1
t ¡ n2
t, market equilibrium and the evolution of the fractions' di®erence are
A ¡ Bpt+1 =
b
2
[pt+1(1 + mt) + pt(1 ¡ mt)]; (25)
mt = tanh
µ
¯
2
·
b
2
(p
2
t+1 ¡ p
2
t) ¡ C
¸¶
: (26)
As in the case of perfectly forward looking agents in (21), the di®erence in fractions mt
in (26) depends upon pt and pt+1, so that the market clearing equation (25) is again
implicitly de¯ned. The following result states that (25-26) determines a well de¯ned,
explicit one-dimensional map pt+1 = h¯(pt):
Theorem 6 Given linear demand and linear supply, for any value of the information
cost C ¸ 0, the intensity of choice ¯ ¸ 0 and the price pt, the system (25-26) implies
a well de¯ned map pt+1 = h¯(pt). That is, there exists a unique minimum non-negative
price pt+1 such that, at time t + 1, either the market is in equilibrium or the excess
supply is positive at pt+1 = 0. Su±cient conditions for continuity of the map h¯ are
¯ < 4=(Ap¤) or , when ¯ > 4=(Ap¤),
1 + tanh
µ
¡
¯
2
C
¶
< 2
B
b
4=(Ap¤)
¯ ¡ 4=(Ap¤)
: (27)
Notice that (27) is always satis¯ed in the limit ¯ ! 1. Some graphs of the map h¯
and the associated dynamics are given in Figure 5. The ¯xed point of the system is the
same as before: E = (p¤;m¤(¯)) = (A=(b + B);tanh(¡¯C=2)). The following theorem
is the analogue of Theorems 1 and 4 in the case of forward looking boundedly rational
agents:
Theorem 7 Assume that the slopes of supply and demand satisfy b=B > 1.
(i) When the information costs C > 0, then there exists a critical value ¯1 such that
for 0 · ¯ < ¯1 the equilibrium is globally stable, while for ¯ > ¯1 the equilibrium
is unstable with eigenvalue,
¸(¯) = ¡
b(1 ¡ m¤(¯))
2B + b(1 + m¤(¯))
At the critical value ¯1 the steady state value m¤(¯1) = ¡B=b.
(ii) When the steady state is unstable, there exists a locally unique period 2 orbit
fp1;p2g.
Notice the similarity between Theorems 1, 4 and 7. In all cases, the primary bifurcation
leading to local instability is the same. After local instability sets in, the global dynam-
ics becomes quite di®erent however. Figures 6 and 3 compare the dynamics of all three
16cases, the original backward looking case, the perfectly forward looking case and the
boundedly rational forward looking case. Both forward looking cases clearly have price
°uctuations with smaller amplitude, as explained already in subsection 3.1. In contrast
to the perfectly forward looking case, with boundedly rational forward looking agents
simulations show that a secondary bifurcation and a rational route to randomness (i.e.
a bifurcation route to chaos) occur, but for higher values of ¯ than in the original BH-
model and with chaotic °uctuations with smaller amplitude. The investigation of the
case ¯ = 1 helps us to understand the origins of this di®erence, the intuition behind
it and its economic consequences.
For ¯ = 1, the di®erence in fractions (26) becomes:
mt+1 =
8
> > > <
> > > :
+1; if
b
2
(p
2
t+1 ¡ p
2
t) > C
¡1; if
b
2
(p
2
t+1 ¡ p
2
t) < C;
and, using (25), the price at time t + 1 becomes
pt+1 =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
p¤; if pt+1 >
p
p2
t + 2C=b
A
B ¡ b=Bpt; if pt+1 <
p
p2
t + 2C=b
p
p2
t + 2C=b otherwise
If we de¯ne ¹ p such that
p
¹ p2 + 2C=b = p¤ and ^ p such that A=B¡(b=B)^ p =
p
^ p2 + 2C=b,
the map h1 becomes:4
pt+1 = h1(pt) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
p¤; pt < ¹ p
p
p2
t + 2C=b; p 2 [¹ p; ^ p]
A=B ¡ b=Bpt; pt > ^ p
(28)
Two graphs of the map h1 are given in Figure 10 in the Appendix illustrating the
proofs. The following theorem states that, if the market is su±ciently unstable, in the
case with boundedly rational agents complicated dynamical behavior arises.
Theorem 8 For ¯ = +1, when the market is locally unstable (i.e. b=B > 1) and
when information costs C > 0, there exists a value M > 1 (depending on p¤, C and b)
such that:
(i) when b=B 2 (1;M], for an interval of initial conditions, the prices dynamics is
bounded away from p¤.
(ii) when b=B > M, there exist in¯nitely many homoclinic points p, that is, points
such that limn!+1 hn
1(p) = p¤ and limn!¡1 hn
1(p) = p¤.
4Notice that ¹ p is only de¯ned if C is not too large. If ¹ p is well de¯ned, so is ^ p and ^ p 2 (¹ p;p¤).
17Recall from subsection 3.1 that in the case with perfectly forward looking agents local
instability always leads to a stable 2-cycle. In the case with boundedly rational forward
looking agents more complicated dynamics arises. Mathematically this di®erence is
explained by the fact that in the perfectly forward looking case the map g1 has two
critical points (i.e. points where the map has a local maximum or a local minimum;
see Figure 1), whereas in the boundedly rational forward looking case the map h1 has
only one critical point (a local maximum) and the map is linearly decreasing for all
p > p¤. In particular, if the local instability is strong enough (i.e. b=B is large enough),
the steady state p¤ of the map h1 has homoclinic points (i.e. points whose time path
converges to p¤ both forward and backward in time). As is well known, existence of
homoclinic points implies complicated, chaotic dynamical behavior as illustrated in the
time series in Figure 6.
From an economic viewpoint the key di®erence is that boundedly rational agents make
errors in their estimation of expected pro¯ts. In particular, when the price pt > p¤
is large, boundedly rational forward looking agents expect a high pro¯t and therefore
stick to the simple, naive strategy. This pro¯t expectation turns out to be wrong, and
the error may become so large that (almost) all agents switch to the rational strategy,
pushing prices back (close) to the steady state. This interaction between local instability
and global stability generates chaotic price °uctuations when the intensity of choice is
high, as in case of backward looking agents. Nevertheless the size of such °uctuations
remains limited as in the case of perfectly forward looking agents. Forward looking
behavior thus dampens the amplitude of price °uctuations, while bounded rationality
may lead to chaotic (small amplitude) °uctuations.
4 An optimizing representative agent
Until now we have focussed on a heterogeneous agent framework, where agents switch
between two predictors, a costly sophisticated and a cheap simple rule. The aim of this
section is to reconcile the heterogeneous agent framework with that of a representative
agent optimally choosing from a continuum of expectation rules of di®erent quality.
The representative agent outweighs the bene¯ts of a better prediction rule against the
costs of information gathering, in the spirit of Simon (1955, 1957). Our approach has
been inspired by a recent paper of Dudek (2004); see also Evans and Ramey (1992).
Consider a cobweb model with a representative supplier. As before the production
decision at time t depends upon the prediction pe
t+1 for the price at time t + 1. The
representative supplier can optimally choose among a continuum of forecasting rules,
each with di®erent quality and costs. At time t, choosing a predictor with quality
q 2 [0;1] corresponds to buy, at a cost C(q), a signal ºt such that
ºt =
8
<
:
pt+1 with probability q;
pt with probability 1 ¡ q:
(29)
The information gathering cost function C(q) is assumed to be increasing and convex.
In order to optimally choose the quality of the signal, the representative agent computes
18his expected net pro¯t and maximizes it with respect to q. In general, a better signal
gives a higher gross expected pro¯t at a higher cost. At period t, the trade o® between
expected pro¯ts and information gathering costs sets the optimal predictor quality,
q¤
t, which determines the optimal supply xt, which, given the demand, determines the
realized price and pro¯t at time t + 1, and so on and so forth. The purpose of this
section is to investigate the equilibrium price dynamics generated by this mechanism
and to compare it with the heterogeneous agent models of the previous Section.
Similarly to Subsection 3:1, we focus on the case of a perfectly forward looking repre-
sentative agent, that is, the representative agent behaves \as if" he has perfect foresight
on expected pro¯t and no systematic errors are made in estimating expected pro¯ts.
Expected pro¯ts of a representative agent choosing the perfect foresight forecast with
probability q and the naive forecast with probability (1 ¡ q) is then given by:
¼
e
t+1(q) = q¼(pt+1;pt+1) + (1 ¡ q)¼(pt+1;pt): (30)
In this case the ¯tness measure for using quality q is given by:
U
e
t+1(q) = ¼
e
t+1 ¡ C(q): (31)
Similarly to the story underlying the managerial perfect foresight equilibrium of Subsec-
tion 3.1, we assume that there is a continuum of managers who o®er to sell a predictor
of quality q 2 [0;1]. The managers have perfect foresight on expected pro¯ts. The
representative agent can not compute the expected pro¯t by himself, but compares
the ¯tnesses announced by the managers without knowing the value of C(q) and thus
being unable to derive pt+1 from public information.
In order to optimally choose the quality of the signal, the representative compares the
¯tness associated with each predictor q 2 [0;1]. At period t, by choosing the predictor,
that is, the level of q that grants him the higher ¯tness, the agents behaves \as if" he
is solving:
ArgmaxqfU
e
t+1(q)g = Argmaxqfq¼(pt+1;pt+1) + (1 ¡ q)¼(pt+1;pt) ¡ C(q)g: (32)
When this maximization problem has an interior solution, this is given by the solution
of the ¯rst order condition:
¼(pt+1;pt+1) ¡ ¼(pt+1;pt) =
b
2
(pt+1 ¡ pt)
2 = C
0(q): (33)
The speci¯c solution depends on the functional form of C(q). In general, given a solution
of the maximization problem at time t, which we shall call q¤
t, we can derive the implicit
equation that sets the price at time t+1. To do that notice that, by the Law of Large
Numbers, on average the representative agent produces:
¹ S(ºt) = S(¹ ºt) = bq
¤
tpt+1 + b(1 ¡ q
¤
t)pt:
At time t + 1 market clearing (implicitly) de¯nes the price pt+1 according to:
A ¡ Bpt+1 = bq
¤
tpt+1 + b(1 ¡ q
¤
t)pt: (34)
The price is only implicitly de¯ned because the optimal level of q is, in general, a
function of pt and pt+1, that is, q¤
t = q¤
t(pt;pt+1). In what follows we investigate the
equilibrium price dynamics for di®erent functional forms of the information gathering
cost function C(q).
194.1 Linear cost function
Consider ¯rst the case of a linear information gathering cost function C(q). The follow-
ing theorem shows that in the linear case, the price dynamics described by (34) exactly
corresponds to the price dynamics of the heterogeneous agent model with perfectly
forward looking agents in Subsection 3.1 when ¯ = 1.
Theorem 9 When the marginal information gathering costs of the representative
agent is constant, i.e. C0(q) = C, the system (33-34) is equivalent to the heteroge-
neous agent system (20-21) with ¯ = 1. Consequently, when the market is locally
unstable the system (33-34) always converges to a period 2 orbit.
This is a ¯rst interesting correspondence between the models: the representative agent
model with a linear cost function for information gathering corresponds exactly to
the heterogeneous agent model with intensity of choice ¯ = 1. This result may be
explained by observing two key features: (1) in the limit ¯ ! 1 all agents choose the
best predictor, so that the heterogeneous agent model reduces to a single agent model
(possibly switching between strategies over time); (2) in the case of a linear information
gathering function in each time period typically it is optimal for the representative
agent to use an extreme signal, that is, to use either q¤ = 0 (naive) or q¤ = 1 (rational
expectations).
4.2 Nonlinear cost function
What is the relation between a heterogeneous agent and a representative agent frame-
work in the case of a general, nonlinear information gathering function C(q)? To answer
this question, it is useful to consider an explicit example. Take as cost function:
C(q;®) = Cq
®; ® > 1;
where C(0) = 0, C(1) = C, C0(0) = 0 and C0(1) = ®C. In this case the maximization
problem (32) may have an interior solution. In order to ¯nd it, we solve the ¯rst order
condition (33) and ¯nd:
q
¤
t =
hb=2(pt+1 ¡ pt)2
®C
i 1
®¡1
:
Notice that as long as the cost function is convex (® > 1), the optimal level of q is an
increasing function of pt+1. This turns out to be important for the uniqueness of the
market equilibrium price. The market equilibrium equation (34) becomes:
A ¡ Bpt+1 =
hb=2(pt+1 ¡ pt)2
®C
i 1
®¡1
b(pt+1 ¡ pt) + bpt: (35)
Theorem 10 Let ® > 1. For any ¯xed value of pt ¸ 0, the system (35) implies a well
de¯ned map pt+1 = r(pt). That is, there exists a unique minimum non-negative price
pt+1 such that, at time t+1, either the market is in equilibrium or the excess supply is
positive at pt+1 = 0.
20A straightforward calculation shows that for any ® ¸ 1 and C ¸ 0 the ¯xed point of
the system is p¤ = A=(b+B), as before. Figure 7 shows a graph of the map in the case
of a quadratic cost function (® = 2). The following theorem characterizes the price
dynamics.
Theorem 11 Let C(q) = Cq2. When b=B < 1, the price dynamics converges to the
steady state equilibrium p¤. When b=B > 1, the steady state is locally unstable and a
unique globally stable 2-cycle exists.
It turns out to be possible to generalize Theorem 11 for any increasing and convex
cost function C(q). In fact, the condition for the existence of an interior solution of
(32) de¯nes four parallel lines with slope one and intercepts
p
2C0(1)=b,
p
2C0(0)=b,
¡
p
2C0(0)=b, ¡
p
2C0(1)=b; see the Proof of Theorem 12 for details. We can use these
lines to de¯ne the price dynamics in di®erent regions, for any given C(q). In some
regions delimited by these lines the representative agent is choosing either q = 0 or
q = 1 (see Figure 7). For all other values of q the dynamics is implicitly determined by
the solution of the corresponding market equilibrium equation. In summary we have:
pt+1 = r(pt) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
p¤ pt+1 ¸ pt +
p
2C0(1)=b
implicit solution pt+1 2 (pt +
p
2C0(1)=b;pt +
p
2C0(0)=b)
A
B ¡ b
Bpt pt+1 2 [pt +
p
2C0(0)=b;pt ¡
p
2C0(0)=b]
implicit solution pt+1 2 (pt ¡
p
2C0(0)=b;pt ¡
p
2C0(1)=b)
p¤ pt+1 · pt ¡
p
2C0(1)=b
(36)
In terms of the deviation xt = pt ¡ p¤ from the steady state, the map becomes:
xt+1 = r(xt) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
0 xt · ¡
p
2C0(1)=b
implicit solution xt 2 (¡
p
2C0(1)=b;¡
p
2C0(0)=b B
B+b)
¡b=Bxt x 2 [¡
p
2C0(0)=b B
B+b;+
p
2C0(0)=b B
B+b]
implicit solution xt 2 (+
p
2C0(0)=b B
B+b;+
p
2C0(1)=b)
0 xt ¸
p
2C0(1)=b
(37)
Figure 7 shows the graph of r in two speci¯c cases. The next Theorem shows that only
this partial knowledge of the map r is su±cient to characterize the price dynamics:
Theorem 12 Let C(q) be any increasing and convex information gathering cost func-
tion. When b=B < 1 the price dynamics converges to the stable steady state p¤; when
b=B > 1 the steady state is locally unstable and a unique globally stable 2-cycle exists.
Notice that according to Theorem 12, in the case of a perfectly forward looking rep-
resentative agent concerning expected pro¯t, in the long run the incentives to buy a
perfect foresight predictor are never strong enough, no matter how strong the local in-
stability of the market is. Stated di®erently, for any functional form of the cost function,
either (when the market is stable) the agent always chooses a cheap naive predictor
(q = 0) or (when the market is unstable) he switches between a naive predictor and a
better, but non-perfect, predictor with q < 1. Before concluding, we present another
interesting relationship between the representative agent and the heterogeneous agent
framework of Subsection 3.1.
21Theorem 13 There exists a non-decreasing and convex information gathering cost
function C(q) such that the price dynamics driven by the interaction of a group of
heterogeneous agents choosing between a freely available naive forecast (q = 0) and a
costly perfect foresight forecast (q = 1) at constant cost C as given by (20-21) is the
same as if a representative agent is operating in the market and optimally chooses a
signal q 2 [0;1] at cost C(q) as in (33-34). For every ¯xed ¯ and C the cost function
C(q) is given by:
C(q) =
8
> > <
> > :
Z q
t0
³2tanh
¡1(2t ¡ 1)
¯
+ C
´
dt; q 2 (t0;1]
0; q 2 [0;t0]
where t0 = (1 + m¤)=2.
It can be shown that this exact correspondence between a heterogeneous agent and
a representative agent framework is not only valid in the perfectly forward looking
case studied in this section, but holds more generally, for example also in the case
of boundedly rational forward looking agents (making mistakes in the estimation of
expected pro¯ts) or in the original framework of BH (1997) (with backward looking
agents and strategy switching based on realized pro¯ts). Hence, the same trade o®
between local instability and global stability when a group of heterogeneous agent is
operating in the market exists when a representative agent optimally chooses the quality
of his price predictor. This kind of theorem shows that, for an outside observer, it would
be impossible to distinguish between a heterogeneous agent and the corresponding
representative agent economy (cf. e.g. the discussion in Kirman (1992)).
5 Conclusion
The Adaptive Rational Equilibrium dynamics can produce complicated equilibrium
price dynamics, due to the interaction between a locally destabilizing force when agents
use simple, cheap strategies and a far from the steady state globally stabilizing force
when errors become so large that most agents switch to the costly rational forecast.
In the original framework, strategy selection is driven by experience or regret, as it
is based upon a measure of past realized pro¯ts In this paper we investigated how
forward looking behavior in strategy selection may a®ect the co-evolving equilibrium
dynamics. With forward looking behavior, the same local instability due to costly
information gathering and free riding remains, but the amplitude of price °uctuations
is dampened. How exactly forward looking behavior a®ects the globally stabilizing force
depends upon how sophisticated agents are in computing expected pro¯ts. When agents
are able to make a perfect forecast for expected pro¯ts, prices lock into a stable 2-cycle
and the errors of the cheap naive strategy remain small enough for the population of
agents never to switch completely to the costly rational forecast. If however agents
can only make a boundedly rational forecast of expected pro¯ts, errors may grow big
enough for (almost) all agents to switch to the costly rational strategy. In that case, the
globally stabilizing force becomes strong enough to push prices back close to the (locally
22unstable) steady state, thus causing irregular switching between price °uctuations of
low and moderate amplitude. Boundedly rational forward looking agents thus dampen
the amplitude of the price oscillations but a rational route to randomness, as in the
backward looking case, remains.
We also have established an equivalence relation between heterogeneous agent mod-
els with evolutionary switching of strategies and a representative agent who optimally
chooses between the bene¯ts of a high quality forecasts and the associated informa-
tion gathering costs. To an outside observer it is impossible to distinguish between
the heterogeneous agent model and the corresponding optimal representative agent
framework.
We emphasize that we have shown these results to hold in a supply driven commodity
market, with negative expectational feedback (i.e. a high price forecast leads to high
production and thus a low realized market price). An interesting question for future
work is whether similar results hold for speculative asset markets. In fact, for asset
markets we conjecture that forward looking behavior may actually destabilize the am-
plitude of price °uctuations, because of the positive expectational feedback (i.e. high
expectations of future asset prices lead to increased asset demand and thus higher
realized market prices). We leave this conjecture for future research.
Another important topic for future research is how \invasion" of boundedly rational
strategies a®ects the long run outcome of a market with heterogeneous agents. In our
cobweb framework, the answer at least depends whether or not more memory comes at
higher costs. When there are no costs, invasion of boundedly rational strategies detect-
ing and exploiting the regular, periodic structure may stabilize the adaptive equilibrium
dynamics. On the other hand, when memory comes at higher costs we have seen an
example where a stable 2-cycle is persistent against invasion of a period-2 forecasting
rule into a market with free naive versus costly rational expectations. Because of its
lower costs, the period-2 rule drives out most of the rational agents, but the stable
2-cycle persists with smaller amplitude. Since the period-2 forecasting rule is optimal
(it coincides with perfect foresight) with minimal use of memory, it seems that this
situation is \evolutionary stable" and persistent against invasion of other boundedly
rational types. Another possibly \evolutionary stable" or persistent long run outcome
may be the situation where the interaction between more and more boundedly rational
strategies leads to chaotic small amplitude price oscillations whose structure can not be
detected and exploited easily by newly invading boundedly rational strategies. A the-
ory of \evolutionary stable" long run outcomes with complicated, irregular equilibrium
market dynamics is an important topic for a future research agenda.
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Figure 1: Perfectly forward looking agents. The graph of pt+1 = g¯(pt) for three di®erent
values of ¯. The three points where all graphs intersect correspond to the steady state
p¤ (in the middle) and points where m(pt;pt+1) = 0, that is, where the pro¯t di®erence
of the two strategies is equal to the net cost C. Other parameters are: A = 1:5, B = 1,
b = 2, C = 0:1.
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Figure 2: ¯ = +1. Comparison of the map pt+1 = g1(pt) in (22) for perfectly forward
looking agents and the corresponding 1-D map in the case of backward looking agents.
The latter has been obtained from the projection of the two dimensional map pt+1 =
f1(pt;pt¡1) in (10) with pt¡1 given by the inverse-image of (pt;¡1) on the line m = ¡1.
Other parameters: A = 1:5, B = 1, b = 2 C = 0:1.
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Figure 3: Bifurcation diagrams with respect to ¯. The case of backward looking agents
(top panel, Section 2), perfectly forward looking agents (middle panel, Section 3.1) and
the case of boundedly rational forward looking agents (bottom panel, Section 3.2). The
other parameters are A = 1:5, B = 1:0, b = 2:0 (so that p¤ = 0:5) and C = 0:1.
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Figure 4: Perfectly forward looking agents. This ¯gure illustrates the persistence of
the stable 2-cycle when free naive and costly rational predictors are available (¯rst
row, left panel) with respect to \invasion" of other predictors (all other panels). If a
period-2 predictor emerges at a cost 0 < C0 < C, the stable 2-cycle persists but with
smaller amplitude (¯rst row, right panel). If a period-2 predictor invades at no cost,
the interaction of naive, rational and period-2 predictors leads to a 3-cycle (second
row, left panel). In the panels that follow, at every step (from left to right and from
top to bottom) a higher period predictor is introduced. This leads to the creation of a
stable 4-cycle, a stable 5-cycle and, ¯nally, to the stabilization of the steady state. In
all cases, parameters are A = 3, B = 1, b = 5, ¯ = 300, C = 0:1.
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Figure 5: Boundedly rational forward looking agents. On the left: map and price dy-
namics for A = 1:5, B = 1:0, b = 2:0, C = 0:1 and ¯ = 20. The price dynamics
converges to a 2-cycle. On the right: map and price dynamics for A = 1:5, B = 1:0,
b = 2:0, C = 0:1 and ¯ = 140. The price dynamics is chaotic.
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Figure 6: Comparison of the cases with backward looking agents (left panel) and bound-
edly rational forward looking agents (right panel). In both cases, there exist homoclinic
points converging both forward and backward in time to the steady state. As a conse-
quence in both cases at irregular time intervals price °uctuations approach the (locally
unstable) steady state. The amplitude of price oscillations is much smaller in the for-
ward looking case. In both cases the parameters are: A = 1:5, B = 0:85, b = 2:15 (so
that p¤ = 0:5), ¯ = 200 and C = 0:1.
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Figure 7: Graphs of the map xt+1 = r(xt) in (37) for di®erent cost functions. Left panel:
C(q) = 0:2q2. Right panel: C(q) = 0:2q2 + 0:1q. In both cases the dynamics converges
to a 2-cycle due to the symmetry of the map around x = 0. The lines parallel to the
diagonal delimit the zones where an interior/border solution exists. In the right panel
an interior solution exists between the two dotted lines at the top and at the bottom.
Other parameters are B = 1 and b = 2:0.
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Proofs of Section 2
Proof of Lemma 1 The map f1 de¯ned in (10) is two-dimensional. De¯ne f1
1 as a
one-dimensional projection of f1 according to
f
1
1(pt) = f1(pt;(f
¡
1;1)
¡1(pt))
where f
¡
1;1(¢) = F1;1(¢;¡1) and F1;1 is the ¯rst component of the map F¯, for ¯ = 1,
de¯ned in Section 2 below equations (8-9). By applying this de¯nition, one can easily
show that
f
1
1(pt) =
½
A
B ¡ b
Bpt; if pt 2 [p¤ ¡ ";p¤ + "]
p¤; otherwise
where " = b
b+B
p
2C=b. The graph of f1
1 is given in Figure 2. The lemma follows by
noticing that the di®erence between the maximum and the minimum of the map f1
1 is
2 b2
B(B+b)
p
2C=b. 2
Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Theorem 3 From (20) the excess supply function ES(pt;pt+1) is given by:
ES(pt;pt+1) =
b
2
(pt+1(1 + m(pt;pt+1)) + pt(1 ¡ m(pt;pt+1))) ¡ A + Bpt+1; (38)
where
m(pt;pt+1) = mt = tanh
µ
¯
2
·
b
2
(pt+1 ¡ pt)
2 ¡ C
¸¶
: (39)
Consider for a moment the function ES(pt;y). We de¯ne a function y = ~ g(pt) such
that ES(pt;y) = 0. A straightforward computation shows that:
@ES(pt;y)
@y
=
b
2
µ
1 + mt + ¯
b
2
(y ¡ pt)
2(1 ¡ mt)(1 + mt)
¶
+ B > 0:
This implies that given any value of pt we can always ¯nd a unique y such that
ES(pt;y) = 0. Consequently the function y = ~ g(pt) is well de¯ned and, by the im-
plicit function theorem, the function ~ g is C1. De¯ne the map g¯ as follows
g¯(pt) =
½
~ g(pt) if ~ g(pt) ¸ 0
0 if ~ g(pt) < 0:
This means that when g¯(pt) = pt+1 > 0, we have ES(pt;pt+1) = 0, whereas when
g¯(pt) = pt+1 = 0, there is excess supply even when the market price is pt+1 = 0. In
fact @ES(pt;y)=@y > 0 implies that when ~ g(pt) < 0, ES(pt;0) > ES(pt; ~ g(pt)) = 0.
Finally the map g is continuous but in general not di®erentiable at the lowest price pt
for which g¯(pt) = 0. 2
29Proof of Theorem 4 In terms of xt = pt ¡ p¤ the system (20-21) becomes:
8
<
:
¡Bxt+1 = b
2 (xt+1(1 + mt) + xt(1 ¡ mt))
mt = tanh
¡¯
2
£
b
2(xt+1 ¡ xt)2 ¡ C
¤¢
with ¯xed point x¤ = 0 and corresponding m¤ = tanh(¡¯C=2). Similarly as in the proof
of Theorem 3 it follows that there exists a well de¯ned map xt+1 = ¹ g¯(xt), obtained
from the map pt+1 = g¯(pt) by choosing p¤ as the origin. To keep the notation simple
we drop the bar, and write g instead of ¹ g in what follows. The following properties of
the map g will be useful to prove the Theorem:
(a) g is odd, that is g(¡x) = ¡g(x), and g(x) > 0 when x < 0.
(b) When ¯ > ¯1 there exists a unique period 2 orbit fa;¡ag, satisfying g(g(a)) = a
and g(a) = ¡a.
(c) g0(0) < g0(x) < 1, for all x.
(d) The map g has two critical points, c and ¡c. Furthermore g0(x) < 0 i® x 2 (¡c;c),
so that g has a local minimum at x = c and a local maximum at x = ¡c.
We postpone the proof of properties (a)¡(d), and ¯rst use them to prove (i)¡(iii) in
Theorem 4. Notice that, (a) and (d) imply that g(c) is in fact a global minimum and
g(¡c) a global maximum. Using the implicit function theorem, we get:
g
0(x) = ¡
@ES(x;y)
@x
@ES(x;y)
@y
jy=g(x) =
¡b(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ m(x;y))
b(1 + m(x;y) + ®(1 ¡ m(x;y))) + 2B
jy=g(x); (40)
where
® =
b
2
¯(y ¡ x)
2(1 + m(x;y))
and ES(x;y) is the excess supply function de¯ned in (38) and m(x;y) is the di®erence
of agents' fractions in (39).
Proof of (i). The global stability of x¤ = 0 when C = 0 follows from the fact that in
this case g is a contraction. Indeed using (40) one gets g0(0) = ¡b=(b + 2B) > ¡1, so
that property (c) implies g0(x) 2 (¡1;1) for all x.
Proof of (ii). The global stability of the ¯xed point when ¯ < ¯1 follows again from
the fact that g is a contraction. In fact
g
0(0) = ¸(¯) = ¡
b(1 ¡ m(0;0))
b(1 + m(0;0)) + 2B
> ¡1 i® ¯ < ¯1;
so that (c) implies g0(x) 2 (¡1;1). Local instability follows from the fact that g0(0) <
¡1 when ¯ > ¯1. The value of ¯1 is determined by the condition g0(0) = ¡1 which
gives m(0;0) = m¤ = ¡B=b.
Proof of (iii). Uniqueness of the period 2 cycle follows from (b). In order to show
global stability of the 2-cycle we have to characterize the shape of the map g2. By
30(d) the map g has only two critical points, ¡c < 0 (local maximum) and c > 0
(local minimum). From now on we concentrate on g2 for x > 0, the results for x < 0
follow by symmetry. We look for the critical points of g2, that is for the points where
(g2)0(x) = g0(g(x))g0(x) = 0. The positive critical points of g2 are the positive critical
point c of g, and points d > 0 such that g(d) = ¡c. We distinguish two cases.
CASE 1:: g(c) > ¡c and g(¡c) < c (see Figure 8). In this case, because c is larger
than the global maximum g(¡c), there is no d > 0 such that g(¡d) = c. Hence c and
¡c are the unique critical points of g2. We claim that (g2)0(x) > 0 when x 2 (¡c;c).
This follows because x 2 (¡c;c) implies both g0(x) < 0 and g(x) 2 (¡c;c) so that
(g2)0(x) = g0(g(x))g0(x) > 0. This, together with g(c) > ¡c, implies that at the unique
point a > 0 for which g(a) = ¡a, we have a < c and g0(a) > 0. When ¯ > ¯1,
g0(0) < ¡1, so that (g2)0(0) > 1. Hence, x = a is the unique intersection point of
g2(x) with y = x and (g2)0(a) < 1. fa;¡ag is therefore a locally stable 2-cycle. Since
g2(x) > 0 for all x > 0 all points (except the unstable steady state) converge and the
2-cycle is globally stable.
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Figure 8: Graph of the map g1 (left panel) and its second iterate g2 (right panel) in
the case when c > a. A = 1:5, B = 1, b = 2, C = 0:1 and ¯ = 20.
CASE 2:: g(c) < ¡c and g(¡c) > c (see Figure 9). In this case there exist two other
positive critical points of g2, d1 and d2, d1 < c < d2, for which g(x) = ¡c. Moreover,
property (b) implies that a is the unique positive intersection point of g(x) with the
line y = ¡x, and since g(c) < ¡c we have d1 < c < a < d2. By symmetry also
¡d1 and ¡d2 are critical points of g2 and ¡d2 < ¡a < ¡c < d1. Clearly g2(d1) and
g2(d2) are local maxima and g2(c) is a local minimum, and using (c) and (d) we get
0 · (g2)0(x) < 1, for all x 2 [c;d2]. This implies that a 2 (c;d2) is a locally stable ¯xed
point of g2. From the global shape of the graph of g2 it follows easily that the 2-cycle
is globally stable.
To conclude the proof we have to show that (a), (b), (c), (d) hold.
(a). In deviations x from the steady state the excess supply function is
ES(xt;xt+1) =
b
2
(xt+1(1 + m(xt;xt+1)) + xt(1 ¡ m(xt;xt+1))) + Bpt+1: (41)
31-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
-0.3 -0.2 -0.1  0  0.1  0.2  0.3
g
(
x
)
x
c
-c
a
-a
d1
-d1
d2
-d2
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
-0.3 -0.2 -0.1  0  0.1  0.2  0.3
g
2
(
x
)
x
c
-c
a
-a
d1
-d1
d2
-d2
Figure 9: Graph of the map g1 (left panel) and its second iterate g2 (right panel) in
the case when c < a. A = 1:5, B = 1, b = 2, C = 0:1 and ¯ = 50.
If ES(x;g(x)) = 0 then also ES(¡x;¡g(x)) = 0, implying g(¡x) = ¡g(x). Moreover,
when x > 0 (x < 0) the only possibility to have ES(x;g(x)) = 0 is g(x) < 0 (g(x) < 0).
(b). We are looking for a point a that g(g(a)) = a. If such a point exists, ES(a;g(a)) = 0
implies ES(g(a);g(g(a))) = ES(g(a);a) = 0 and vice versa. Hence the existence and
uniqueness of a period-2 orbit fa;g(a)g is equivalent to the existence and uniqueness of
a such that ES(a;g(a)) = ES(g(a);a) = 0. Consider the change of variable z = a+g(a),
w = g(a) ¡ a. We can rewrite ES(a;g(a)) = ES((z ¡ w)=2;(z + w)=2) = f ES(w;z).
In terms of the new variables and the function f ES, the existence and uniqueness of
a is equivalent to the existence and uniqueness of two points ¹ z and ¹ w such that both
f ES( ¹ w; ¹ z) = f ES(¡ ¹ w; ¹ z) = 0. Writing down these two conditions as a function of the
new variables one obtains: 8
<
:
¹ z = ¡
B+bm( ¹ w)
B+b ¹ w
¹ z =
B+bm( ¹ w)
B+b ¹ w
(42)
where, with abuse of notation, m(w) is the di®erence of fraction in (39) de¯ned as
a function of g(a) ¡ a = w. Notice that if a solution of (42) exists, then ¹ z = 0 and
bm( ¹ w) = ¡B. Obviously ¹ z = 0 implies g(a) = ¡a. The other equation bm( ¹ w) = ¡B is
only possible when ¯ > ¯1. In fact, when ¯ < ¯1, m(0) > ¡B=b so that m(w) > m(0)
implies m(w) > ¡B=b. When ¯ > ¯1, bm(w) = ¡B has two symmetric solutions.
Consequently, a unique symmetric 2-cycle fa;¡ag exists for ¯ > ¯1.
(c). The expression of g0(x) in (40) can be rewritten as:
g
0(x) =
¡b(1 ¡ ®)
b
³
(1+m(x;y))
(1¡m(x;y)) + ®
´
+ 2B
(1¡m(x;y))
; (43)
where
® =
b
2
¯(y ¡ x)
2(1 + m(x;y))
Since the di®erence of fractions m is an increasing function of (y ¡ x)2, ® is also an
increasing function of (y ¡ x)2. Moreover ® ¸ 0 and ® = 0 when (y ¡ x)2 = 0. These
properties together with m 2 (¡1;1) imply that the denominator of g0(x) is a positive
32increasing function of (y ¡ x)2 and that the numerator is an increasing function of
(y ¡ x)2 which is negative when (y ¡ x)2 = 0. These facts imply that the minimum of
g0(x) is achieved when y ¡ x = 0 that is when y = x which implies x = 0. Moreover
when g0(x) > 0, that is when ® > 1, one can easily show that the numerator is always
smaller then the denominator so that g0(x) < 1 for all x.
(d). A critical point c satis¯es g0(c) = 0. From (43), and from the facts that ® is
increasing in (y ¡ x)2 and ® = 0 for (y ¡ x)2 = 0, it follows that there exists a unique
(y¡x)2 = k such that g0 = 0. In order to show that g has a unique critical point c > 0,
we thus have to show that c is the unique solution of (g(c) ¡ c)2 = k. This translates
into showing that g(c) ¡ c = ¡
p
k has a unique positive solution5. We claim here the
more general statement that the line y = x ¡ h and the curve y = g(x) intersect only
once when x > 0, 8h > 0. Change variables from (x;y) to (x;h = x ¡ y), and consider
ES as a function of the new variables. We have ES(x;y) = ES(x;x ¡ h) = c ES(x;h).
One can easily show that holds:
@ c ES(x;h)
@x
=
@(b=2((1 + m(h))(x ¡ h) + (1 ¡ m(h))x) + B(x ¡ h))
@x
= B + b > 0:
As a consequence we can apply the implicit function theorem and ¯nd a function t
such that c ES(x = t(h);h) = 0. This means that 8h > 0 it exists a unique x = t(h) and,
as a consequence, a unique y = x ¡ h where c ES(x;h) = c ES(x;x ¡ y) = ES(x;y) = 0.
From the last expression it follows that y = g(x), as a result given h there exists
a unique couple of points (x;g(x)) such that g(x) = x ¡ h. From this we conclude
that g(x) ¡ x = ¡
p
k has a unique solution c. Property (a) implies c > 0. Since
c is the unique positive critical point, by symmetry also ¡c is a critical point.
Being c and ¡c the only critical points and g0(0) < 0 it must be that g0(x) < 0
i® x 2 (¡c;c). This implies that g(c) is a local minimum and g(¡c) a local maximum. 2.
Proof of Theorem 5 The existence of a 2-cycle can be proven along the same lines
as in Theorem 4. Consider the explicit de¯nition of g1 in (22). Let c and ¡c be the
critical points and d2 > c and ¡d2 < ¡c points such that g(d2) = ¡c and g(¡d2) = c as
in the proof of Theorem 4. A straightforward computation shows that g2(x) = x for all
x 2 [¡d2;c][[c;d2]. This implies that g has a continuum of 2-cycles. The computation
of ¢g
1 follows directly from the de¯nition of the map g1 in (22). 2
Proof of Theorem 6 From (25) excess supply is given by
ES(pt;pt+1) =
b
2
[pt+1(1 + mt) + pt(1 ¡ mt)] ¡ A + Bpt+1 = 0;
where as in (26)
mt = tanh
µ
¯
2
·
b
2
(p
2
t+1 ¡ p
2
t) ¡ C
¸¶
:
5Since by (a) g(x) < 0 when x > 0, in this case the equation g(c) ¡ c = +
p
k has no positive
solution.
33We are looking for a function h (we drop the subscript ¯ here) such that ES(pt;h(pt)) =
0. First, we show that there always exists a unique minimum non-negative price pt+1
such that, at time t + 1, either the market is in equilibrium or the excess supply is
positive at pt+1 = 0. Second, we show that under certain parameters restrictions h is
continuous.
Existence. Write y = pt+1 and x = pt, and let p¤ = A=(B +b) as usual and notice that
ES(p¤;p¤) = 0. Consider y > x, it can be veri¯ed that in this case:
@ES(x;y)
@y
=
b
2
µ
1 + mt +
¯
2
by(y ¡ x)(1 ¡ mt)(1 + mt)
¶
+ B > 0: (44)
Consequently we can apply the implicit function theorem and there exists a C1 map h
such that ES(x;h(x)) = 0. The case y < x is more di±cult, since @ES(x;y)=@y may
be zero. We can rewrite the condition ES(x;y) = 0 as:
2(A ¡ (B + b)y)
b(y ¡ x)
= m(y;x) ¡ 1 (45)
where
m(y;x) = tanh
µ
¯
2
b
2
(y
2 ¡ x
2) ¡
¯
2
C
¶
:
For y < x, ¡2 < m ¡ 1 < ¡1 together with (45) imply
A
B
¡
b
B
x < y <
2A
2B + b
¡
b
2B + b
x (46)
and therefore also x > p¤: Eq. (45) and ¡2 < m ¡ 1 < ¡1 also imply that when y = 0
there is a value ~ x 2 (A=b;2A=b) such that ES(~ x;0) = 0. Furthermore since
@ES(x;y)
@x
jy=0 =
b
2
(1 ¡ mt ¡ ¯bx(y ¡ x)(1 ¡ mt)(1 + mt))jy=0 > 0 (47)
such a value is unique and ES(x;0) > 0 for x > ~ x, so that we can de¯ne h(x) = 0
for x 2 [~ x;1). Notice that for all y · x, @ES(x;y)=@x > 0. By the implicit function
theorem there exists a C1 function x = s(y) such that ES(s(y);y) = 0. Clearly
s(p¤) = p¤ and s(0) = ~ x. Furthermore by(46), s(y) must always be between the lines
y = A=b ¡ b=Bx and y = 2A=(2B + b) ¡ b=(2B + b)x. The function h we are looking
for is not well de¯ned yet since many di®erent y values may be mapped to the same
x through the map s. However, when this is the case case, we can always choose the
minimum of these y values. Consequently there always exists a unique minimum non
negative price y = pt+1 such that, at time t + 1, either the market is in equilibrium or
the excess supply is positive at pt+1 = 0 so that h is well de¯ned. Notice that y = pt+1
is the lowest non negative price for which ES(pt;y) ¸ 0.
Continuity. The map h de¯ned above may be discontinuous. A su±cient condition for
continuity can be obtained by restricting parameters values such that @ES(x;y)=@y >
0, also for y < x. In order to obtain such restriction we use (44) and (45) to evaluate
@ES(x;y)=@y > 0 in those points (x;y) for which ES(x;y) = 0:
@ES(x;y)
@y
jES=0 = B + (1 + m(x;y))
b
2
(1 ¡ ¯y(A ¡ (B + b)y)) > 0: (48)
34Since (46) implies that 0 < y < p¤, we have 1¡¯y(A¡(B+b)y) has a minimum value
1 ¡ (¯Ap¤=4). As a consequence condition (48) is satis¯ed when
B + (1 + m(x;y))
b
2
(1 ¡ ¯
Ap¤
4
) > 0: (49)
This is clearly always the case when ¯ < 4=(Ap¤). Otherwise, when ¯ ¸ 4=(Ap¤), since
0 · y < x, condition (49) is satis¯ed when
B + (1 + m(0;0))
b
2
(1 ¡ ¯
Ap¤
4
) > 0: (50)
which can be rewritten as condition (27) in Theorem 6. 2.
Proof of Theorem 7 From Theorem 6 one can derive that the map h¯(p) is always
well de¯ned and di®erentiable in a neighborhood of the point (p¤;p¤). Furthermore one
can use expression (44) and (47) to compute:
(h¯)
0(p
¤) = ¸(¯) = ¡
(@ES(x;y)=@x)j(p¤;p¤)
(@ES(x;y)=@y)j(p¤;p¤)
= ¡
b(1 ¡ m¤(¯))
2B + b(1 + m¤(¯))
The value of ¯1 is found by imposing ¸(¯) = ¡1. Local stability follows from ¸(¯) 2
(¡1;0) when ¯ < ¯1. When ¯ > ¯1, ¸(¯) < ¡1 and graphical analysis of h2
¯ shows
that h2
¯ has (at least) two other intersection points with the diagonal than p¤. 2
Proof of Theorem 8 Consider the map h1 given in (28). Call ¹ p = a and ^ p = c that
is a solves
p
a2 + 2C=b = p¤ and c solves A=B ¡(b=B)c =
p
c2 + 2C=b. One can show
easily that these points always exist, as long as 2C=b < (p¤)2 which we assume here,
are unique, and c > a. In terms of the points a and c, the map h1 can be rewritten as:
h1(pt) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
p¤; 0 · pt < a
p
p2
t + 2C=b; p 2 [a;c]
p¤ ¡ (b=B)(pt ¡ p¤); pt > c:
The map h1 has a global maximum at the critical point c. Let d be the point such
that h1(d) = a. Notice that when p > d, h2
1(p) = p¤. Two examples of the map are
given in Figure 10.
Since b=B > 1, the steady state p¤ is locally unstable. In what follows we show that
for b=B su±ciently large, there are (in¯nitely many) homoclinic points, whose orbits
converge to p¤ both forward and backward in time. We consider two cases:
CASE 1:: h1(c) < d (as in the left panel of Figure 10). When h1(c) < d we
have h2
1(c) < h4
1(c) < p¤ < h3
1(c) < h1(c). Let I1 = [h2
1(c);h4
1(c)] and I2 =
[h3
1(c);h1(c)]. In this case it is easy to show all initial states p0 are \repelled" from
p¤ and mapped in I1 [ I2 after some iterations. The long run dynamics is therefore
contained in the set I1 [ I2. and therefore bounded away from p¤.
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Figure 10: Graphs of the map h1. In the left panel (b=B = 1:2) h1(c) < d implies
that the price °uctuations remain bounded away from p¤ in the long run. In the right
panel, (b=B = 2), h1(c) > d implies that the map has (in¯nitely many) homoclinic
points and a typical price time series converges to the locally unstable steady state p¤.
Other parameters: A = 1:5, b = 2 and C = 0:1.
CASE 2::, h1(c) ¸ d (as in the right panel of Figure 10). In this case the critical point
c is a homoclinic point. It converges to p¤ forward in time and also backwards in time
(take successive inverse images x > c, with hk
1(x) = c, k = 1;2;:::). In fact, there is an
interval I of homoclinic points containing c.
To conclude the proof we have to show that there exists an M > 1 such that when
b=B > M then case 2 obtains, i.e. h1(c) ¸ d. We derive the existence of such a value M
from the dependence of the point d and h1(c) upon b=B. De¯ne B=b = N, N 2 (0;1).
Depending upon N, p¤, C and b, the point d and the image h1(c) are de¯ned as:
d(N) = p¤ + N
³
p¤ ¡
p
(p¤)2 ¡ 2C=b
´
h1(c;N) = p¤ +
p¤
1¡N
³q
1 + 1¡N
1+N(2C)=b ¡ 1
´
One can show that d(0) < h1(c;0), d(1) > h1(c;1) and d0(N) > 0. Furthermore
(p¤)2 > 2C=b, which is assumed here to guarantee the existence of a and c, is a su±cient
condition for @h1(c;N)=@N < 0. These facts imply that there exists a unique N such
that d(N) = h1(c;N). It follows that there exists a unique M = 1=N such that: (i)
when b=B 2 (1;M], case 1: applies, and (ii) when b=B > M, case 2: applies. 2
Proofs of Section 4
Proof of Theorem 9 When C0(q) = C the ¯rst order condition (33) for the optimal
choice of q becomes:
¢¼t+1 =
b
2
(pt+1 ¡ pt)
2 = C
Consequently in general there is no interior solution, but q¤
t = 1 if ¢¼t+1 > C and
q¤
t = 0 if ¢¼t+1 < C. This implies that the equilibrium price dynamics (34) is governed
either by naÄ ³ve expectations or by rational expectation, which gives exactly the same
dynamical system as in (20-21) with ¯ = +1, or equivalently as in (22). 2
36Proof of Theorem 10 Consider the market equilibrium equation (35):
A ¡ Bpt+1 =
hb=2(pt+1 ¡ pt)2
®C
i 1
®¡1
b(pt+1 ¡ pt) + bpt:
Notice that, given the values of the parameters A, B, b, ®, C, for any ¯xed value of
pt ¸ 0 the demand (l.h.s) is a decreasing function of pt+1, while the supply (r.h.s) is an
increasing function of pt+1 provided that ® > 1. This implies that there exists a unique
point x 2 R where demand and supply are equal. Notice that this point is negative for
those values of pt for which there is excess supply at pt+1 = 0, that is when
(1 ¡
h bp2
t
2®C
i 1
®¡1
)bpt ¸ A
In this case we set pt+1 = 0, and otherwise pt+1 = x. 2
Proof of Theorem 11 This is just a special case of Theorem 12. 2
Proof of Theorem 12 Market clearing in (34) implicitly de¯nes a map pt+1 = r(pt)
by ES(pt;r(pt)) = 0, that is,
ES(pt;r(pt)) = q
¤
tb(r(pt) ¡ pt) + bpt ¡ Bpt+1 + A = 0;
where q¤
t solves the maximization problem (32), whose F.O.C is
¢¼t+1 =
b
2
(pt+1 ¡ pt)
2 = C
0(q): (51)
The F.O.C. (51) gives only the interior optimal solution. From the convexity of C(q) it
follows that C0(0) is a global minimum and C0(1) is a global maximum of C0(q). Hence,
q¤
t = 0 if ¢¼t+1 · C0(0) and q¤
t = 1 if ¢¼ ¸ C0(1). These two conditions on ¢¼t+1
de¯ne four parallel lines in the plane (pt;pt+1) with slope 1 and intercepts
p
2C0(1)=b, p
2C0(0)=b, ¡
p
2C0(0)=b, ¡
p
2C0(1)=b. The interior solution (51) determines the map
r only in the region between the relevant lines as in (36), or the corresponding map in
deviations from the steady state x in (37). The implicitly de¯ned part of r in (37) is
the function r(xt) that solves
ES(xt;r(xt)) = q
¤
tb(r(xt) ¡ xt) + bxt ¡ Br(xt) = 0; (52)
with
q
¤
t = q(xt;xt+1) = (C
0)
¡1(
b
2
(xt+1 ¡ xt)
2):
Notice that, since C0(q) is increasing, (C0)¡1 is always a well de¯ned function and is
itself increasing. We claim that the map r has exactly the same properties (a-d) as the
map g in the proof of Theorem 4. From property (c) it follows that when b=B < 1,
¡1 < g0(x) < 1, so that the map is a contraction and all orbits converge to the steady
state p¤. From properties (a ¡ d) and the proof of Theorem 4 it follows that when
b=B > 1 the steady state is locally unstable and a unique globally stable 2-cycle exists.
37We conclude the proof by showing that properties (a-d) hold. in this case.
(a). From (52) it follows immediately that if ES(x;r(x)) = 0, then ES(¡x;¡r(x)) = 0.
Hence r(¡x) = ¡r(x).
(b) We show that y = r(x) has only one positive intersection a with the line y = ¡x.
This follows from a change in variables z = x+r(x) and w = r(x)¡x as in the proof of
Theorem 4. In this case the corresponding system (42) has solution only when b=B > 1.
(c) Obviously when the map in (37) is explicitly de¯ned, r0(x) = 0 or r0(x) = ¡b=B. In
order to compute r0(x) when it is implicitly de¯ned one can use the implicit function
theorem and obtain:
r
0(xt) = ¡
@ES=@xt
@ES=@xt+1
=
q0(xt;xt+1)(xt ¡ xt+1)2 + q(xt;xt+1) ¡ 1
q0(xt;xt+1)(xt ¡ xt+1)2 + q(xt;xt+1) + B
b
(53)
Since both q and q0 are always positive, from the expression above it follows that
r0(xt) 2 [¡b=B;1). Notice that q0 is positive i® C0(q) is convex.
(d). Consider the proof of property (d) in Theorem 4. One can prove here that the
same statement holds by replacing (52) with (38) and (53) with (43). 2
Proof of Theorem 13 Comparing (34) and (12), we have to show that there exists a
non decreasing, convex, information gathering cost function C(q), such that the optimal
solution of the representative agent problem (32) is given by:
q
¤
t = n1;t =
1 + tanhf
¯
2[b
2(pt+1 ¡ pt)2 ¡ C]g
2
: (54)
From the ¯rst order condition in (33) for an arbitrary cost function we obtain:
q
¤
t = (C
0)
¡1
µ
b
2
(pt+1 ¡ pt)
2
¶
: (55)
Combining (54) and (55) it follows that:
(
b
2
(pt+1 ¡ pt)
2) = C
0
Ã
1 + tanh
¡
¯[b
2(pt+1 ¡ pt)2 ¡ C]
¢
2
!
: (56)
In terms of the variable z = b=2(pt+1 ¡ pt)2 ¸ 0, (56) becomes:
z = C
0
³1 + tanhf
¯
2[z ¡ C]g
2
´
:
The change of variable t = (1 + tanh(¯(z ¡ C)=2))=2 gives an ordinary di®erential
equation:
2tanh
¡1(2t ¡ 1)
¯
+ C = C
0(t); (57)
whose solution is the cost function C(q) we are looking for. The restriction z ¸ 0
implies t ¸ (1 + tanh(¡¯C=2))=2 = t0. In integral form, C(q) is given by:
C(q) =
Z q
t0
µ
2tanh
¡1(2t ¡ 1)
¯
+ C
¶
dt + C0; q 2 (t0;1]
38Notice that t0 = 1+m¤
2 , C(t0) = C0 and C0(t0) = 0. This guarantees that when pt =
pt+1 = p¤ the solution of (55) is q¤ = (1 + m¤)=2, the minimum fraction of rational
agents at the ¯xed point in the heterogeneous agent model. When q < t0 one can de¯ne
without loss of generality, C(q) = C0, and take the integration constant C0 = 0. As a
result one gets
C(q) =
( R q
t0
³
2tanh¡1(2t¡1)
¯ + C
´
dt q 2 (t0;1]
0 q 2 [0;t0]
By construction, the function C(q) above has derivative C0(q) = 0 when q · t0, and
C0(q) as in (57) when q > t0. Using this plus the fact that the function (tanh)¡1(2t¡1)
is positive and increasing when t ¸ t0, it follows that the map C(q) is non-decreasing
and convex. 2
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